The development of a prototype alerting system for a conceptual free ight environment is discussed. The alerting logic is based on a probabilistic model of aircraft sensor and trajectory uncertainties that need not be Gaussian distributions. Monte Carlo simulations are used over a range of encounter situations to estimate con ict probability as a function of intruder position, heading, and speed, as determined through a datalink between aircraft. Additionally, the probability of con ict along potential avoidance trajectories is used to indicate whether adequate space is available to resolve a con ict. Intruder intent information, e.g., ight plan, is not included in the model but could be used to reduce the uncertainty in the projected trajectory. Four alert stages are de ned based on the probability of con ict and on the avoidance maneuvers that are available to the ight crew. Preliminary results from numerical evaluations and from a piloted simulator study at NASA Ames Research Center are summarized.
Introduction

F
UTURE air traf c management concepts such as free ight have been proposed to provide a means by which traf c ow ef ciency can be increased. 1 Under free ight, current methods of traf c separation through the use of a rigid airway structure and intrail spacing would be relaxed. Consequently, aircraft would have more exibility to follow arbitrary routes in response to changing conditions. To compensate for the loss of airway structure, automated con ict detection and resolution tools would be required to aid pilots and/or ground controllers in ensuring traf c separation.
Because ow ef ciency is a driver for free ight, it is desirable that con icts be resolved using minor course, speed, or altitude changes well before emergency avoidance maneuvers are needed. It is also desirable, given the large number of aircraft in the air, that con ict alerts are only generated when necessary. However, the large amount of uncertainty in the free ight environment makes it dif cult to determine how likely a projected con ict is to occur. The result is a tradeoff between alerting early to provide a large safety margin (and also producing unnecessary alerts) vs alerting late to reduce unnecessary alerts (but requiring more aggressive avoidance maneuvers).
Traditionally, alerting systems have been designed through an iterative, evolutionary process. 2¡4 After de ning alerting thresholds, the performance of the system (in terms of the protection it provides and the unnecessary alert rate) is typically evaluated through simulations of traf c encounters. If collisions or excessive unnecessary alerts occur, the alerting thresholds are modi ed to improve performance; thus, the performance tradeoffs are generally examined post hoc.
The tradeoff between safety and unnecessary alerts is well known in signal detection problems and alerting systems. 5, 6 One recent approach to view the tradeoff is the system operating characteristic (SOC) curve. 7, 8 The SOC curve explicitly shows the expected safety level and unnecessary alert rate as a function of the alert threshold setting. The shape of the SOC curve depends on sensor accuracy, uncertainties in the future ight paths of the aircraft, and human performance. Thus, changes in sensors or avoidance strategies can be evaluated by examining their impact on the shape of the SOC curve.
A novel approach is presented to alerting system design in which the performance tradeoffs are directly addressed in order to select alerting thresholds. SOC curves are used to aid in threshold placement, reducing the need for iterative modi cations to improve performance. A prototype alerting system was developed using Monte Carlo simulations to assess the probability of a con ict over a range of free-ight traf c encounters. The logic was then exercised in a set of piloted free-ight simulation studies at the NASA Ames Research Center in the fall of 1996. This study examined enroute con icts and acted as a testbed for the alerting logic presented here.
Background
The use of probability estimation has been explored in con ict analysis before. 7¡10 In previous work, Paielli and Erzberger 9 developed a viable analytical solution to determine the probability of a con ict for two aircraft maintaining a straight-ahead course. Their approach used Gaussian uncertainties to model along-and crosstrack error and can be rapidly solved and implemented in real time. If more complex (non-Gaussian) uncertainties (such as aircraft changing course or pilot reaction latency) are modeled, it becomes increasingly dif cult to obtain an explicit analytical solution; thus, the use of the Monte Carlo method in this paper. It is not to say that introducing extra parameters leads to more accurate results, but instead, it demonstrates that probability analysis is not restricted to one or two density distributions. Because it is based on Monte Carlo simulation, the approach presented here is more exible but requires signi cantly more processing time than the approach in Ref. 9 . Uncertainty parameters used in Ref. 9 are incorporated into the prototype logic presented here, and both approaches would produce identical results if aircraft were assumed to continue along a straight, level course.
The work in this paper, however, goes farther than just describing how the calculations were made to determine the probability values. Part of the ongoing research is to determine how this knowledge can be utilized effectively in an actual alerting system. Previous work by Kuchar 7, 8 recognized the need to include escape maneuvers as part of the probabilistic alerting analysis. This is necessary to ensure that suf cient maneuvering space is still available to avoid the con ict if required. The avoidance trajectories are evaluated probabilistically to account for uncertainty in ight crew response time and variability in their actions. The most favorable avoidance trajectories can then be explicitly determined based on the likelihood of safely maneuvering out of the con ict.
Methodology
The design of the prototype alerting system was guided in part by NASA requirements for their experiment. Though the concepts developed can be extended to a ground-based system to aid air trafc control (ATC), the prototype logic was tailored to an airborne system where con icts are primarily resolved on the ight deck. The structure of free ight has not yet been de nitively established, but it is presumed that state information from surrounding aircraft (position, speed, and heading) is available through interaircraft datalink communication such as automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B). The alerting system must, therefore, provide ample warning time so that strategic maneuvers can be examined and coordination between ight crews can be carried out.
To simplify its development, the alerting system described here was designed for one-on-one con icts during enroute ight. A more complete, operational system would have to be additionally evaluated for its ability to resolve con icts between more than two aircraft. The aircraft with the alerting system is referred to as the host aircraft; the other aircraft involved in the con ict is termed the intruder. A con ict is de ned as a situation in which the intruder enters a protected zone around the host aircraft. Based on current separation standards, the protected zone was de ned to be a cylinder 5 n miles in radius and extending 1000 ft above and below the host aircraft.
A multistaged threshold approach was used to provide a series of alerts to indicate trends in con ict hazard. The multistage approach allowed the means of implementing the alert to be tailored to the level of threat. Low-probability threats resulted in relatively passive alerts such as changing the color of a traf c symbol. High-probability, urgent threats produced aural warnings to actively inform the pilots of the con ict. Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the multistage approach. Three stages (marked 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 1 ) produced changes in traf c display symbology in the cockpit of the host aircraft. As implemented, the outermost threshold provided a strategic indication of potential threat more than 10 min into the future and up to 200 n miles away. In the NASA 747-400 simulator, a hollow traf c symbol on the map display changed color when the rst threshold was exceeded, and the ight crew could begin to coordinate resolution with the other aircraft. If the encounter continued, an additional stage informed the ight crew of the heightening con ict by lling in the traf c symbol. At the third stage (3), an aural alert zone transgression message was provided to the ight crew, indicating that they should take action to resolve the con ict. At this point, there was still ample time to coordinate resolution with other aircraft. If the con ict continued without resolution, an air traf c controller took over authority for con ict resolution at the authority transition (AT) zone.
The current traf c alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) logic was not modi ed and was kept in the simulation as an independent, nal warning system. But, because the alerting thresholds on the present TCAS 6.04A version are based on limited variables (range and closure rate), TCAS cannot accurately predict whether a con ict will occur beyond a few minutes. TCAS can track trafc within a range of 40 n miles, and its earliest alert can be triggered approximately 1 min before the estimated closest point of approach.
4,11 A new version of TCAS (V7.0) is expected to be available in 1998 and will increase the range to 100 n miles using ADS-B via mode-S to transmit additional position, heading, and vertical speed information. 12 The prototype alerting system can also be expected to utilize the same aircraft state data to estimate future trajectories.
Aircraft Trajectory Model
To determine the probability of con ict, a baseline model of aircraft trajectories was developed. Figure 2 is a pictorial representation of an aircraft in a free-ight environment. The modeled parameters include uncertainty in the current position estimate, future along-and crosstrack position variability, and the potential for and magnitude of course changes. Figure 3 summarizes the uncertainty parameters used in the baseline trajectory model. Uncertainty in current position results from the accuracy of combined global positioning system and inertial navigation system estimates and is modeled as a normally distributed random variable with standard deviation of 50 m laterally and 30 m vertically. Course drift in the future trajectory is modeled as a 15-kn standard deviation speed uctuation (along-track error) and a 1 n mile standard deviation crosstrack error. These tracking error values are based on data obtained empirically from traf c by Paielli and Erzberger. 9 It is assumed that only the current state of the intruder (position, heading, speed) is known on the host aircraft through ADS-B. The intruder's ight plan or target states, e.g., from the ight management system (FMS) or autopilot, are not available to the host aircraft. Accordingly, there is some uncertainty as to whether the intruder will maintain its current course. As an initial estimate, the likelihood of an intruder heading change is modeled as an exponential distribution with a mean rate k of four turns per hour. This follows from the assumption that heading changes occur in a Poisson manner. When a heading change is made, its magnitude is modeled probabilistically as well. The intruder is equally likely to make heading changes left or right between 5 and 20 deg and is less likely to make turns of less than 5 deg (see Fig. 3) .
Similarly, the intruder may change altitude. Altitude changes are also modeled as an exponential distribution with a mean likelihood of four occurrences per hour. When a change in altitude occurs, the intruder is equally likely to climb or descend to any altitude within 10,000 ft of its current altitude.
The host aircraft is assumed to y a straight trajectory except for the along-and crosstrack described variations. However, to select between alternative con ict resolution options, it is important to also evaluate the reduction in con ict probability that can be achieved if the host aircraft maneuvers. Accordingly, a model of host aircraft resolution maneuvers was also developed. In reaction to a con ict alert, the ight crew response latency is modeled as a probabilistic gamma distribution with a mean of 1 min and a variance such that there is a 95% probability that the response occurs within 2 min. The relatively long latency is intentionally designed to allow time for coordination with other aircraft and/or ATC. Thus, avoidance maneuvers are assumed to have a large time buffer built in. Once initiated, avoidance maneuvers could include turns, altitude changes, or speed changes.
Note that the values of the parameters used in the trajectory model are estimates at this point and are not expected to be completely representative of free ight. Because free ight does not currently exist, it is dif cult to predict the probabilistic nature of aircraft trajectories. However, such a prediction is necessary to estimate the likelihood of con icts. Even if the values of the parameters are unknown, the impact of changes in the parameters can be evaluated to determine their relative importance. This in turn will help focus future efforts on improving trajectory estimation. For example, the heading and altitude changes in the intruder model can be modi ed to account for intent information relayed from the intruder's FMS computer. Information such as the next waypoint and the status of the autopilot, e.g., lateral navigation mode, can be used to reduce the probability of a trajectory change (heading, altitude, speed) outside the intended path corridor.
Con ict Analysis
The probability of a con ict [P(C)] is de ned as the probability that the intruder will enter the host aircraft's protected zone given that no alert is issued and that the host aircraft maintains its current course and speed. To calculate P(C), the positions of the two aircraft must be projected into the future to determine the likelihood of a protected zone violation. However, an explicit analytical solution incorporating the uncertainty variables listed in Fig. 3 cannot easily be formulated. Instead, Monte Carlo simulations are used.
Given the locations, speeds, and headings of the host and intruder aircraft, the P(C) can be estimated through Monte Carlo simulation. Each Monte Carlo run consists of stepping through the trajectories of both aircraft over time and determining whether a con ict occurs. The trajectories vary randomly with each run according to the distributions from Fig. 3 . For instance, in one run the intruder might make a 14-deg course change 1 min into the ight; in another run, the intruder may follow a straight-line path for 30 min. After a certain number of Monte Carlo runs, a count of the number of protected zone intrusions was made. Dividing the number of intrusions by the total number of Monte Carlo runs is then an estimator of P(C). P(C) was determined through the separate analyses of the horizontal-and vertical-plane situations. A con ict occurs when there are both horizontal and vertical separation violations:
In the horizontal plane, the Monte Carlo simulations were performed over a range of state estimates for the intruder and for several host aircraft avoidance maneuvers. The result of each set of Monte Carlo runs is a plot of the probability of a horizontal con ict for the speci c situation (intruder position, heading, speed) and host aircraft trajectory (straight ahead or maneuvering). Initial intruder positions were varied over a grid of dimensions 200 n miles on a side, in 1-n mile increments. Two intruder velocities were used along with nine intruder heading angles. Nine different host aircraft trajectories were also examined for each intruder situation. The nine host aircraft trajectories included straight ahead, left and right turns of 10 and 20 deg, and 10 and 50 kn speed increases and decreases. The resulting set of probabilities was then stored in a series of lookup tables indexed by position, heading, and speed. Figure 4 shows a contour plot of the likelihood of horizontal conict for a speci c encounter situation in which the host aircraft is ying at a heading of 360 deg and an intruder is currently estimated to be ying at a heading of 330 deg. The plot shows actual data based on 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations spaced every 1 n mile. In  Fig. 4 , the host aircraft is in white at the lower left. The plot shows the con ict probabilities for an intruder aircraft in the surrounding airspace relative to the host aircraft. For example, an intruder in the position shown in the gure will cause a horizontal con ict in the future with probability 0.45. If the intruder were farther north or east of the host aircraft, this probability would decrease. As the intruder nears the host aircraft, the probability of a con ict will increase if the intruder remains on a collision course. If the intruder changes heading or speed (or if the host aircraft performs an avoidance maneuver), a different contour plot would represent the probability of a con ict.
The vertical con ict probability was obtained by determining the likelihood that the intruder aircraft would follow a vertical path that intersected the protected zone. This was performed through an analytical solution of the vertical probability parameters. Different potential vertical maneuvers of the host aircraft were also evaluated by incorporating the host aircraft's vertical speed into the vertical model.
Alerting Design Tradeoffs
The size of the alert zone affects the performance of the alerting system. If the alert zone is too large, an excessive number of unnecessary alerts will be generated. If the zone is too small, there may not be enough space or time in which to maneuver to avoid a con ict. This tradeoff can be examined using two parameters: the probability of successful alert (SA) and the probability of unnecessary alert (UA).
When an alert is issued, it is de ned to be successful if the protected zone is not violated. Thus, the probability of successful alert [P(SA)] is the probability that a con ict does not occur when an avoidance maneuver is performed. Therefore, P(SA) is a function of time and the speci c avoidance maneuver that is performed by the host aircraft:
An alert is classi ed as unnecessary if the alert was not required to avoid a protected zone violation. The probability of unnecessary alert [P(UA)] is the probability that a con ict would not have occurred had the host aircraft continued on its current course:
To maximize system performance, it is desirable to maximize P(SA) and minimize P(UA). These goals cannot generally be met simultaneously, and a tradeoff must be managed.
This tradeoff can be visualized using a system operating characteristic (SOC) curve. 7, 8 An example is shown in Fig. 5 . An SOC curve is a plot of P(SA) for a given avoidance maneuver vs P(UA). Each point on the SOC curve represents an alerting threshold setting. For example, in Fig. 5 , threshold 1 corresponds to a large alert zone: alerts are generated early, resulting in a large value for P(SA) but also a high rate of UAs. As the alert zone size is reduced, the threshold moves along the SOC curve to points 2 and 3. The result is a reduction in UAs but also a reduction in SAs because less time and space are available to perform the avoidance maneuver.
An ideal system would operate in the upper-left-hand corner, where P(UA) is zero and P(SA) is one: ideally, all alerts are necessary and successful. In reality, SOC curves do not reach the ideal operating point. Instead, the threshold must be placed along the curve based on the tradeoff between UAs and SAs.
The shape of the SOC curve is a function of sensor accuracy, the type of avoidance maneuver, operator response latency, and maneuvering aggressiveness. As sensor accuracy is increased or as response time is reduced, for example, the SOC curve will move closer to the ideal operating point.
An SOC curve that lies along the diagonal from the origin [P(SA) D 0, P(UA) D 0] to the upper-right-hand corner [P(SA) D 1, P(UA) D 1] represents a system that is poorly designed. In such a case, an alert is as likely to be successful as unnecessary. This means that alerting is just as likely to produce a con ict as not alerting. Thus, the more that the SOC curve moves away from the diagonal, the better the alerting decision.
Because P(SA) depends directly on the choice of avoidance maneuver, a different SOC curve can be constructed for each maneuver option. The most effective avoidance options can then be identi ed based on the shape of their SOC curves.
Prototype Alerting Logic
As already described, the prototype system uses four alert stages. The rst three stages produce alerts in the cockpit that are intended to aid the ight crew in resolving the con ict before tactical maneuvering is required. At the fourth stage, ATC is noti ed to issue commands to provide traf c separation. To set the conditions at which these stages are triggered, it is necessary to examine the tradeoffs between P(UA) and P(SA). This requires balancing the likelihood of a con ict against the ability of the host aircraft to avoid a con ict. To do so, ve standard con ict resolution maneuvers were considered: 1) left heading change of 30 deg, 2) right heading change of 30 deg, 3) climb or descent at 2000 ft/min, 4) speed increase of 50 kn, and 5) speed decrease of 50 kn.
These maneuvers serve as benchmarks for estimating the ability of the host aircraft to avoid a con ict. When the intruder is far from the host aircraft, any of these ve maneuvers could be used to resolve the con ict. As the intruder nears the host aircraft, some of these maneuvers may no longer provide the required separation between aircraft. The premise behind the alerting logic is that if a suf cient number of these maneuvers are still available to the pilot, the alert can be delayed. When the pilot's options begin to disappear, an alert should be issued.
A maneuver was de ned to be available to the host aircraft if, by performing the maneuver, the probability of a con ict was reduced to less than 0.05, i.e., P(SA) > 0.95. The ve maneuver options just listed included the probabilistic response time described earlier (with a mean latency of 1 min). Thus, when a maneuver was deemed to be not available, safe separation could still be achieved if the pilot reacted more quickly or more aggressively than assumed in the model.
In real time, the logic calculated the number of avoidance maneuvers available N to resolve a con ict with the intruder. This was done using the probability contour data stored in lookup tables for each of the ve avoidance maneuvers. By comparing N with P(UA), the appropriate alert stage was de ned as shown in Table 1 .
The leftmost column of Table 1 shows the probability of a con ict if the host aircraft continues along its current trajectory. This assumes that the intruder's trajectory can be represented by the model discussed earlier. The rightmost column shows P(UA), which as discussed earlier is related to P(C) by Eq. (3). The other columns indicate the de ned alert stages as a function of N . Generally, the more options available to the pilot, the lower the alert stage.
For example, if P(UA) is 0.35 and there are two avoidance maneuvers available, then the alert stage is 2. If P(UA) drops below 0.3 Table 1 Alert level classi cation Number of avoidance maneuvers available N P(C j no maneuver ) None One Two Three or more P(UA) or if N is reduced to 1, then the alert stage increases to 3. If P(UA) drops below 0.1, then the AT stage is triggered. Note that because the probability of con ict along different avoidance maneuvers can be estimated, the alerting logic can also be used to determine the magnitude of maneuvering required to resolve a con ict. By interpolating P(SA) between different maneuvering magnitudes, the required action to resolve a con ict with 95% condence can be determined. For example, if P(SA) for a 10-deg right turn is 0.93 and P(SA) for a 20-deg right turn is 0.97, then a 15-deg turn will result in P(SA) of approximately 0.95. Thus, the probability data can be used both to determine P(SA) when a maneuver is speci ed and to determine the magnitude of maneuvering that is required to achieve a speci ed value of P(SA).
To better understand the underlying design process, the thresholds from Table 1 can be mapped into SOC curves. Figure 6 shows SOC curves for two coaltitude aircraft on a collision course along ight paths at right angles to one another. SOC curves corresponding to each of the ve resolution maneuver options are shown.
When the intruder is far from the host aircraft, the situation maps into the upper-right-hand corner of the plot: it is likely that a con ict will not actually occur [P(UA) D 1], and it is likely that any avoidance action would resolve the situation [P(SA) for each of the ve avoidance maneuvers equals 1]. Data for Fig. 6 were not obtained beyond 200 n miles, and so the SOC curves in the gure do not extend all of the way to the upper-right-hand corner.
As the intruder continues on a collision course, it becomes more clear that a con ict will occur: P(UA) decreases, and the situation moves from right to left along the curves. Thus, P(UA) is related to the distance between aircraft and to the time before closest point of approach. As P(UA) decreases, P(SA) also decreases in differing amounts according to the different SOC curves. The effectiveness of a given maneuver depends on how slowly its P(SA) decreases.
When a curve's value of P(SA) drops below 0.95, the corresponding avoidance maneuver is no longer available. Thus, as the situation progresses to the left in Fig. 6 , the different avoidance maneuvers become unavailable, in order, from speed changes to turns and nally to climb or descent. Thus, the SOC curves show that for this case, vertical maneuvers are the most effective.
The rst maneuvers to become unavailable are the speed change maneuvers, at P(UA) of approximately 0.9. This is because large speed changes are generally required to resolve con icts in the time scales under consideration.
Until P(UA) drops below approximately 0.25, turns and climb/ descent avoidance maneuvers will still provide the required separation. At approximately P(UA) D 0.25, however, a 30-deg left turn maneuver is no longer an option. At approximately P(UA) D 0.2, the 30-deg right turn is also no longer an option. When P(UA) reaches approximately 0.1, the climb/descend options become unavailable.
At a given value of P(UA), N corresponds to the number of SOC curves that have values above P(SA) D 0.95. Figure 6 also shows when the four alert stages are triggered as a function of P(UA). Cross referencing with Table 1 , stage 1 is triggered when N is 3 or more and P(UA) drops to 0.6. Stage 2 is triggered when P(UA) drops to 0.4, and stage 3 is triggered when N drops to 2. Finally, the AT stage is triggered when N drops to 0. Although Fig. 6 shows SOC curves for a direct collision between two aircraft on perpendicular ight paths, other geometries produce similar patterns.
The ve avoidance maneuvers used here are intended to represent strategic maneuver limits. A large response time (mean D 1 min) is modeled in the avoidance maneuvers (see Fig. 3 ) and when N is 0, the host aircraft can still maneuver out of the con ict. A more aggressive, tactical maneuver such as a 45-deg-heading turn or a combined climbing turn may still be available when the ve assumed strategic maneuvers are not.
Further examination of the SOC curves shows that speed changes make only a limited contribution to the prototype logic. In many cases, a speed change of greater than 50 kn is required for adequate separation with 95% con dence. As can be seen from Fig. 6 , the SOC curves for the speed maneuvers deviate only slightly from the diagonal. Thus, it is dif cult to provide successful, necessary alerts with speed control alone. Similar dif culties with relying on speed control are mentioned by Krozel et al., 13 using a much different con ict analysis method based on optimal control theory.
Evaluation
The calculation of the probability of con ict is time consuming due to the large number of required Monte Carlo simulations. Accordingly, the probability contours were stored in lookup tables to be accessed in real time. In operation, the system takes aircraft state data and compares their values against the lookup tables to determine the appropriate alert stage using Table 1 . When state values varied between the indices of the lookup tables, the values were linearly interpolated to estimate the probability of con ict.
The alerting logic was evaluated using numerical encounter simulations at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also in a human-in-the-loop simulation study at NASA Ames Research Center. These evaluations were not exhaustive but were used to explore several research issues.
As examples, Figs. 7 and 8 show the observed times at which the alert stages were triggered for two different encounter scenarios. Figure 7 shows the same situation described by the SOC curves in Fig. 6 : two aircraft on a collision course on perpendicular trajectories. Alert stage 1 is triggered 12.3 min prior to the time of closest point of approach (CPA). Stages 2 and 3 are triggered at approximately 8.5 and 5.8 min to CPA, respectively. ATC is noti ed to take over authority (at the AT stage) at 3.3 min to CPA. Finally, TCAS produces a traf c advisory (TA) at approximately 45 s and a resolution advisory (RA) at 35 s to CPA. Figure 8 shows a case in which the two aircraft are not on a direct collision course but will pass within 6 n miles of one another. Stage 1 is triggered 6.5 min before CPA, and stage 2 is triggered 2.2 min before CPA. A TCAS TA is also generated at approximately 30 s before CPA. When the traf c passes the host aircraft, the alert stages gradually decrease. Thus, the logic increases the alert stage as the potential for a con ict rises and reduces the alert stage as it becomes less likely that the intruder could turn and cause a con ict.
At the NASA Ames Research Center, the prototype alerting logic was incorporated in a 747-400 simulator as part of a study of pilot decision-making aids for free ight. In this study, enroute con icts were scripted to examine pilot response and to exercise the alerting logic.
In operation, the alerting logic was used to trigger the four stages of alerts discussed earlier. Additionally, the probability data were used to determine the magnitude of maneuvering required to resolve con icts at a speci ed level of con dence. The pilots in the study were given an interactive tool to explore different maneuvering options. These maneuvers were compared against the probability data to determine whether the con ict would be resolved with 95% condence. The cockpit display then indicated to the pilot whether the proposed maneuver was likely to be successful.
Preliminary results from the NASA study show that the pilots successfully resolved con icts without ATC guidance in most cases. AT alert stages were only observed in scenarios where the intruding aircraft was purposely diverted toward the host aircraft at close proximity. However, a more complete analysis is required to more fully evaluate the alerting logic and to determine the potential impact of airborne con ict resolution on air traf c management.
Concluding Remarks
The Monte Carlo approach used has the advantage that it can handle complex, non-Gaussian probability distributions. However, a major limitation is that a signi cant amount of preprocessing is required before the alerting thresholds can be de ned. Once the thresholds are selected, they only apply to the speci c probabilistic model used in the Monte Carlo runs. If a change in the model is required, e.g., to examine the effect of varying sensor accuracy, then the Monte Carlo simulations must be rerun using a new model to update the alerting thresholds. In contrast, the analytical solution used in Ref. 9 can be solved in real time but relies on simple Gaussian distributions. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the complexity of the probabilistic model and the ability to estimate probabilities rapidly.
Lookup tables were chosen to codify the alerting thresholds for this system because of their relative simplicity. However, it may be more effective to use neural networks to map the encounter situation directly to the alerting thresholds without the use of lookup tables. Neural nets can be trained off-line using the precalculated data from the Monte Carlo simulations. Once trained, a neural net could represent the alerting thresholds in the real-time system.
Another consideration involves the scope of the con ict. The resolution maneuvers used to develop the alerting logic are based on the immediate problem of avoiding a con ict and do not consider the additional maneuvering required to return to the original ight path. Thus, the logic does not incorporate issues such as increased fuel burn or ight time in the decision to alert. Because the proposed bene ts of free ight revolve around ef cient traf c ow, it will be necessary to incorporate cost-based considerations into the logic in the future. This can be achieved, for example, by weighing avoidance maneuver options by the additional cost or deviation each option would incur.
Finally, centralized traf c management issues have been ignored. Because, as assumed in this free ight concept, pilots have initial responsibility for traf c separation, ground controllers could have dif culty when suddenly presented with a con ict that was not resolved by the ight crews. Additional con ict detection and resolution aids must be provided for ground controllers to enable them to return to the traf c management loop and handle traf c once they are alerted to a con ict. Alternatively, it may be more appropriate for all con ict detection and resolution activities to be performed on the ground. In either case, the design approach presented could be applied in an air, ground, or mixed mode of operation to develop appropriate alerting thresholds.
